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COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
LESTER B. ORFIELD*
MENTAL INCAPACITY
In a civil action in tort in which the court cited criminal cases the
Supreme Court held that a witness, to have sufficient mental capacity
to be judged competent, must have the capacity to observe, the capacity
to remember, and the capacity to communicate.' The witness must have
sufficient mental capacity to apprehend the obligation of an oath. The
trial court passes on the issue upon examination of the witness and any
competent witness who can speak as to the nature and extent of his in-
sanity. Mental capacity is a preliminary question for the judge upon due
challenge.2 A witness may testify although he had once been adjudicated
insane.'
Where the defendant was tried for rape without any question of
mental competency raised, but two weeks later on appearance for sen-
tencing he was found insane and sent to a mental institution, on release
three years later he was entitled to a hearing as to his mental capacity at
the time of trial and conviction.4 A trial judge did not err in refusing to
appoint a psychiatrist to examine the defendant at his request where
the defendant, as his own counsel, ably conducted his defense.5
* Professor of Law, Indiana University; Member United States Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, 1941-1946; Consultant,
American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence, 1939-1942; author of
Criminal Procedure From Arrest to Appeal (1947) and Criminal Appeals in
America (1939).
1 District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U.S. 519, 521 (1883). The Court cited
an English manslaughter case, Rex v. Hill, 5 Cox Cas. 250. See also Ross v.
United States, 93 F. 2d 950, 951 (7th Cir. 1937) ; United States ex rel. Lo
Pizzo v. Matthews, 36 F. 2d 565, 567 (3rd Cir. 1929). See on the competency
of witnesses 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§483-721 (3rd ed. 1940) ; McCORMICK,
EVIDENCE 139-150 (1954) ; MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 74-90 (1954) ;
3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 65-128 (12th ed. 1955); UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE 710-734 (4th ed. 1935) ; 3 JONES, EVIDENCE 1390-1529 (5th ed. 1958);
9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 177-197 (1926).
On mental capacity see 2 WGmORE, EVIDENCE §§492-501 (3rd ed. 1940);
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 140 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
78-79 (1954) ; 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 84-92 (12th ed. 1955) ; UNDER-
HILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 717-721 (4th ed. 1935) ; 3 JONES, EVIDENCE 1405-1407,
1414-1418 (5th ed. 1958). Notes 26 A.L.R. 1488, 1491 (1923) and 148 A.L.R.
1131, 1140 (1944) ; Redmount, The Psychological Bases of Evidence Proce-
dures: Intelligence, 42 MINN. L. REV. 559 (1958).
2 Young v. United States, 107 F. 2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1939).
3 Shibley v. United States, 237 F. 2d 327, 334 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 873 (1956). The Court cited 2 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§492-501 (3rd ed.
1940). See also United States ex rel. Dunkele v. Cavell, 151 F. Supp. 675, 676
(W.D. Pa. 1957).
4 Wells v. United States, 239 Fed. 931 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
5 Shelton v. United States, 205 F. 2d 806, 815 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 892 (1953).
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Where no formal objection was raised to a witness' mental qualifica-
tion, and the record revealed that the witness had responded to cross-
examination and to questions put to him by the trial judge, failure of
the trial judge to explore his mental capacity was not error.6 The form
of the examination for competency is in the discretion of the trial court,
but it is good practice for the court to question the witness or be present
ht examination by counsel.7
Lack of mental capacity is a basis for impeachment of the witness.
A court has stated: "The existence of insanity or mental derangement
is admissible for the purpose of discrediting a witness."8
Where a Government witness admitted on examination by the judge
(the jury being absent) that up to the time of his arrest he had taken
opium and heroin hypodermically but stated that he had not taken them
since, the trial judge could determine that the witness was entirely clear
and rational, and need not require the witness to bare his arm.' If the
defendant, because of the influence of intoxicants or narcotics, is not
able to comprehend the proceedings and conduct his defense, a convic-
tion will be reversed.' 0
MENTAL IMMATURITY
Whether an infant is competent is largely in the discretion of the
trial judge. An infant five and one-half years old was permitted to tes-
tify as to the murder of the deceased, his parent, it first being shown
on examination of the infant that he was intelligent, understood the
difference between truth and falsehood, and the consequences of false-
hood, and what was required by the oath."" A boy thirteen years old was
permitted to testify for the Government in a narcotics prosecution . 2
The witness need not be able to define the meaning of the word "oath."
A six year old child was competent to testify to an indecent assault on
her when on cross-examination she testified that she believed that per-
6 United States v. Thayer, 209 F. 2d 534, 537 (7th Cir. 1954).
7Henderson v. United States, 218 F. 2d 14, 17 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349
US. 920 (1955).
8 United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
9 Tanuzzo v. United States, 174 F. 2d 177, 181 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 815 (1949). See 15 A.L.R. 912 (1921).10 United States v. Ray, 183 F. Supp. 769, 772 (D.Md. 1960) ; Alexander v. United
States, 290 F. 2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Pledger v. United States, 272 F. 2d
69 (4th Cir. 1959) ; Coates v. United States, 273 F. 2d 514, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
See 83 A.L.R. 2d 1067 (1962).
11 Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524 (1895).
On mental immaturity see 2 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§505-509 (3rd ed. 1940);
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 140-141 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
80-81 (1959) ; 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 92-96 (12th ed .1955) ; UNDER-
HILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 722-727 (4th ed. 1935) ; 3 JONES, EVIDENCE 1407-1414(5th ed. 1958) ; Notes, 39 VA. L. REV. 358 (1953) ; Comment, 8 ARK. L. R.v.
100 (1953) ; Notes, 10 Wyo. L. J. 214 (1956) ; Stafford, The Child as a Witness,
37 WASH. L. REV. 303 (1962).
32 Oliver v. United States, 267 Fed. 544, 547 (4th Cir. 1920). The court cited 2
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §505 (3rd ed. 1940).
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sons who did not tell the truth would be punished.1 3 Where the victim of
an indecent assault was three years and eight months old, the trial court
found her incompetent to testify after talking with the child. 14 A girl
thirteen years old, the victim of statutory rape, may testify as to her
age. 15 On prosecutions for taking indecent liberties with children, the
alleged girl victims (aged six and eight) were allowed to testify. 6 But
a girl aged five was not allowed to testify after the trial court examined
her as to competency. 1 7 A recent case considered knowledge of the na-
ture of an oath, but held that the child need not be able to answer ab-
stract questions on matters of general knowledge.' A ten year old girl
was permitted to testify as to commission of an indecent act on a minor.
In a prosecution for indecent assault, a child was allowed to testify al-
though he stated that he did not know the difference between right and
wrong. 9 In a prosecution for indecent assault, the testimony of the
victim of about four years and ten months was admitted.20
SEAMEN
In an early case Circuit Justice Story instructed the jury: "Seamen,
like other persons, if not interested or infamous, are competent witnesses
in the trial of criminal as well as civil cases."
21
ENEMY ARMY OFFICER
An enemy army officer is competent to testify.22 He may testify in a
treason trial. When a witness takes the stand he is assumed to be compe-
tent, and incompetency must be shown by the party objecting to him.
He may testify in his full uniform and give the Nazi salute. Any objec-
tion goes to the credibility of the testimony, and not to competency.
NEGROES
As early as 1806 it was held that a slave was a competent witness for
"I.Beausoliel v. United States, 107 F. 2d 292, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1939). The court
cited 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §506 (3rd ed. 1940).
14 Brown v. United States, 152 F. 2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
t Antelope v. United States, 185 F. 2d 175 (10th Cir. 1950).
16 Henton v. United States, 196 F. 2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1952). A child 72 years
old was held competent in Williams v. United States, 3 D.C. App. 335, 339
(1894) in a larceny prosecution.
17 Jones v. United States, 231 F. 2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1956).is Doran v. United States, 205 F. 2d 717, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 828 (1953) citing 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §507 (3rd ed. 1940).
19 Posey v. United States, 41 A. 2d 300, 301 (D.D.C. 1945) citing 2 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §506 (3rd ed. 1940).
20 In re Lewis, 88 A. 2d 582, 583 (D.D.C. 1952) citing 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§505 (3rd ed. 1940). See also Taiton v. Government of Guam, 187 F. Supp. 75,
76 (D. Guam 1960). A child five years old was allowed to testify on a prose-
cution for vagrancy.
21 United States v. Freeman, 25 Fed. Cas. 1208 (No. 15, 162) (C.C.D. Mass. 1827).
"2 Stephan v. United States, 133 F. 2d 87, 95 (6th Cir. 1943), cert. denied 318
U.S. 781 (1943). See also Gillars v. United States, 182 F. 2d 962, 970 (D.C.
Cir. 1950).
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a free Negro.23 A mulatto born of a white woman, and not in a state of
servitude by law, is a competent witness for a white man.24
In early cases arising in the District of Columbia it was held that a
slave is not a competent witness against a free Negro person in a capital
case, the offense being arson.25 But under the Maryland act of 1817 free
Negroes or mulattoes, unless they are in a state of servitude by law, are
competent witnesses against free Negroes.2 Free born Negroes and
mulattoes not subject to any term of servitude by law, are competent in
all cases, including cases where the defendant is white.27 In 1837 it was
held that a slave was a competent witness against Negroes or mulattoes
in a prosecution in the District of Columbia, the court applying a Vir-
ginia statute of 1792.28 In 1827 it was held that a mulatto is not a com-
petent witness against a colored man jointly indicted with a white man
as the testimony against one defendant would operate against the other.29
The court relied on a Virginia statute of 1792.
In 1840 the Circuit Court for the District of Maryland held that a
Negro could testify against a defendant who was not a Christian white
person under a Maryland statute of 1808.30 But if the defendant was a
Christian white person then Negroes and mulattoes, free or slave could
not testify. Negroes could testify for and against each other.
In 1864 Congress provided by statute against exclusion of Negro
witnesses because of race. The statute provided: "That, in the courts
of the United States there shall be no exclusion of any witness on ac-
count of color."'31 Writers on Abraham Lincoln have pointed out that
he advocated such statutes.
RELIGIOUS BELIEF
At common law want of religious belief resulted in incompetency.
3 2
23 United States v. Shorter, 27 Fed. Cas. 1072 (No. 16,284) (C.C.D.C. 1806).
On competency of Negroes see 2 WIG oRE, EVIDENCE §516 (3rd ed. 1940).24 United States v. Davis, 25 Fed. Cas. 775 (No. 14,925) (C.C.D.C. 1835).
25United States v. Swann, 27 Fed. Cas. 1379 (No. 16,425) (C.C.D.C. 1803). See
United States v. Hill, 26 Fed. Cas. 318 (No. 15,365) (C.C.D.C. 1808); United
States v. Butler, 25 Fed. Cas. 213 (No. 14,699) (C.C.D.C. 1812) ; United States
v. Gray, 26 Fed. Cas. 17 (No. 15,252) (C.C.D.C. 1829).
26United States v. Barton, 24 Fed. Cas. 1024 (No. 14,533) (C.C.D.C. 1803).
27 United States v. Fisher, 25 Fed. Cas. 1886 (No. 15,101) (C.C.D.C. 1805) ; United
States v. Mullany, 27 Fed. Cas. 20 (No. 15,832); (C.C.D.C.) 1808); United
States v. Douglass, 25 Fed. Cas. 896 (No. 14,988) (C.C.D.C. 1813).
28United States v. Farrell, 25 Fed. Cas. 1051 (No. 15,074) (C.C.D.C. 1837).
29 United States v. Birch, 25 Fed. Cas. 1148 (No. 14,596) (C.C.D.C. 1827).
3o United States v. Dow, 25 Fed. Cas. 901, 902 (No. 14,990) (C.C.D. Md. 1840).
3113 Stat. 351 (1864). See also REV. STAT. §1038 (1878). See In re Reynolds, 20
Fed. Cas. 592, 612 (No. 11,721) (N.D.N.Y. 1867); Green v. United States
79 U.S. (9 Wall.) 655, 656 (1869). See as to competency of Chinese in
deportation cases, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893).
32 Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 326 (1891).
The testimony of an atheist was held not admissible in Anonymous, 1 Fed.
Cas. 999 (No. 446) (D.Mo. 1839).
On religious belief see 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §518, 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§1816-1829 (3rd ed. 1940); McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE 141 (1954); M ORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 79-80 (1954); 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
1962-63]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Where the defendant objected to a witness for the government on the
ground of his lack of religious belief the court refused the request of
the defendant to examine the witness on the voir dire. Another person
was sworn as a witness and testified that in a conversation with the pro-
posed witness a few weeks ago, in answer to a question, the proposed
witness stated that he did not believe in the existence of a God or a fu-
ture state of rewards and punishments. The proposed witness was then
permitted, at his own request, to explain his belief. He stated that he
believed Nature to be God, and God to be Nature. He stated that swear-
ing on the Bible was no more significant than swearing on any other
book. He did not believe in existence after death. The court rejected the
witness.
33
Where the defendant objected to a witness for the Government on
the ground that he did not believe in the existence of a God and a future
state of rewards and punishments, the Court permitted the witness to
state what his opinions were. 4 The witness then stated that he had al-
ways believed in the existence of a Supreme being, and that such being
would punish him in this world or the next for his evil deeds; that he
now believes in a future state of existence; and that he regularly sent
his children to Sunday school, and his wife and children to church. A
police officer testifiel that prior to the trial the witness had made a
similar statement. A witness for the defendant testified that she had
heard the witness express himself otherwise some years ago. The wit-
ness was held competent.
In a civil action by the Government for trespass on public lands it
was held that a witness who believes merely that punishments are in-
flicted in this life is a competent witness, although his credibility is af-
fected.35 The modern practice is not to interrogate a witness as to his
religious belief. Instead his belief is proved by witnesses who may have
learned his belief from his own declarations. Under the former practice
the witness was examined on this point either before or after he was
sworn.
In a case decided in 1918, a court of appeals held that a witness was
competent despite lack of religious belief because this was the law of the
state when it was admitted to the Union.36 The court made no reference
to a federal trial court decision in a case tried in the same state two years
75-77 (12th ed. 1955) ; 3 JONES, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 1395-1396 (5th ed. 1958);
UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 715-717 (4th ed. 1935); Hartogensis, Denial
of Equal Rights to Religious Minorities and Non Believers, 39 YALE L. J.
659, 666-671 (1930) ; Comment, 38 NOTRE D. L. 95 (1962).
a3United States v. Lee, 26 Fed. Cas. 908 (No. 15,586) (C.C.D.C. 1834). Onejudge dissented. See also Wakefield v. Ross, 28 Fed. Cas. 1346, 1347 (No.
17,050) (C.C.D.R.I. 1827).
34 United States v. White, 28 Fed. Cas. 550, 551 (No. 16,675) (C.C.D.C. 1836).
-3 United States v. Kennedy, 26 Fed. Cas. 761 (No. 15,524) (C.C.D. II. 1843).
31 Louie Ding v. United States, 247 Fed. 12, 14 (9th Cir. 1918).
[Vol. 46
COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES
earlier holding to the opposite effect.3 7 The trial court based its decision
on the common law, but not the common law of any particular state.
Where the witness stated that she did not believe in the God of the
Bible, nor in rewards or punishment after death, but recognized a duty
to speak the truth, she was allowed to testify upon affirmation.3 , The
phraseology as to interpretations in the light of reason and experience
in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was held to
warrant this conclusion.
CONVICTION OF CRIME
A witness is incompetent who has been convicted of a conspiracy to
defraud the creditors of an insolvent debtor, as this is an infamous
crime.39 It partakes of the crimen falsi. But a person convicted of assault
and battery with intent to murder in a court of a state in which the
federal court sat and sentenced to fine and imprisonment is competent, as
the offense is not infamous. 40 The court stressed the nature of the of-
fense, but added that even if the punishment was the test, the punish-
ment here inflicted was not infamous. To disqualify, conviction must
have been for treason, felony or crirnen falsi.41
In about 1880 a court held that while at common law a person con-
victed of an infamous crime was incompetent as a witness, 42 in England
and in most states this disqualification has been removed and the convic-
tion may be shown only to affect credibility. 43 If such a person may not
testify, the conviction must be shown by the record. The record of a
judgment of conviction in a state court of another state is not admissible
unless attested in accordance with the federal statute,44 and duly certi-
fied. In 1884 the Supreme Court held that as to a case tried in Utah
Territory, one convicted of murder could testify under a Utah statute.
41
3united States v. Miller, 236 Fed. 798, 799 (W.D. Wash. 1916). A person
believing that "all his punishment is in this world, while he is here; I don't
think it comes from God," was held incompetent.
38 Gibbons v. United States, 182 F. 2d 962, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1950Y. The court cited
6 WIGMORE, EVImNCE §1816 et seq. (3rd ed. 1940); UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE ch. 28 (4th ed. 1935).
30 United States v. Porter, 27 Fed. Cas. 595, 597 (No. 16,073) (C.C.D.C. 1812).
On conviction of crime see 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§488, 519-524 (3rd ed.
1940); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 141-142 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE, 81-82 (1954); 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 78-84 (12th ed.
1955); 3 JONES, EVIDENCE 1399-1405 (5th ed. 1958); UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE 727-731 (4th ed. 1935).
40 United States v. Brockins, 24 Fed. Cas. 1242 (No. 14,652) (C.C.D. Pa. 1811).
Circuit justice Washington queried whether statutory punishment by confine-
ment to hard labor would destroy competency unless the offense is infamous.
41 Keliher v. United States, 193 Fed. 8, 23 (1st Cir. 1912).
42 See Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 326 (1892).
43 United States v. Biebusch, 1 Fed. 213, 214 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1880). As the decision
refers to a statute of 1878 the decision must have been rendered after that
date. See also United States v. Wood, 28 Fed. Cas. 762, 763 (No. 16,760)(C.C.D.C. 1834); Bise v. United States, 144 Fed. 374, 375 (8th Cir. 1906)
citing 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1270 (3rd ed. 1940).44 REV. STAT. §905.
'I Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 587 (1884).
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In 1892, the Supreme Court held that a conviction of an offense made
the person incompetent only in the jurisdiction of conviction at common
law.4 6
In 1907 a court held that a convicted person may testify "unless
settled principles or precedents absolutely force such a construction." 47
The rules of the common law were applicable, and not state statutes.
One who had been convicted of embezzlement was guilty only of a mis-
demeanor, and therefore could testify. Embezzlement was not treason,
felony, or crimen falsi; hence the common law did not bar.48 In 1913 a
court applied the common law of the state so as to exclude one convicted
of a felony and sentenced to 15 months in the penitentiary. 49 The crimen
falsi covered not only a charge of falsehood, but also injuriously affect-
ing the administration of justice. If any change is to be made in the law,
Congress should make it.50 In 1918 a court held a witness convicted in
another state was competent, as the early law of the state made only lo-
cal convicts incompetent.51
A mere plea of guilty does not render a witness incompetent. 52 A
judgment of conviction is necessary to produce that result.
A witness who has been pardoned may testify.' 3 However, if the
pardon is invalid or does not cover all convictions the witness is incom-
petent. 4
An early case held that the statute making defendants competent to
testify did not render competent a defendant who, by a previous convic-
tion of an infamous crime, had lost the privilege of testifying."
In 1916 a court held that a conviction of an infamous offense in the
same state did not make the convict incompetent; only a federal convict
would be incompetent.56 Finally in 1918 the Supreme Court determined
that the "dead hand of the common law rule of 1789 should no longer
46 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 303 (1892).
4 United States v. Sims, 161 Fed. 1008, 1010 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1907).
4SUnited States v. Sims, 161 Fed. 1008, 1012 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1907). In Keliher
v. United States, 193 Fed. 8, 23 (1st Cir. 1912) conviction of a misdemeanor
was held not to disqualify although the penalty could be more than one year.
49 Maxey v. United States, 207 Fed. 327, 329 (8th Cir. 1913) fraudulent use of
mails.
5 See also the dissenting opinion in Rosen v. United States, 237 Fed. 810, 811(2d Cir. 1916).
51 McCoy v. United States, 247 Fed. 861, 863 (5th Cir. 1918).
52 United States v. Wilson, 60 Fed. 890, 899 (D. Ore. 1894) ; Bise v. United
States, 144 Fed. 374, 376 (8th Cir. 1906) ; Fetter v. United States, 258 Fed.
567, 576 (2d Cir. 1919).
53 United States v. Jones, 26 Fed. Cas. 644, 647 (No. 15,493) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1824);
United States v. Wilson, 28 Fed. Cas. 699, 704 (No 16,730) (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1830); Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 453 (1891); Logan v. United
States, 144 U.S. 263, 303 (1892) ; United States v. Hughes, 175 Fed. 238, 241
W.D. Pa. 1892) ; Thompson v. United States, 202 Fed. 401, 406 (9th Cir. 1913).
'4Stetler's Case, 22 Fed. Cas. 1314, 1315 (No. 13,380) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1852)
In re Greathouse, 10 Fed. Cas. 1057, 1059 (No. 5,741) (C.C.N.D. Calif. 1864).
5 United States v. Hollis, 43 Fed. 248 (W.D.S.C. 1890). Compare 2 WIGMIORE,
EVIDENCE §524 at 618 (3rd ed. 1940).
56 Brown v. United States, 233 Fed. 353, 354 (6th Cir. 1916).
[Vol. 46
COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES
be applied" to the question of incompetency because of conviction of
crime. 57 The court stated that it disposed of the question "in the light of
general authority and sound reason." Congress had removed disability
because of perjury. The states had adopted a rule of competency of per-
sons convicted of crime. Under Rule 26 a witness convicted of a crime
could testify.58
In the absence of a request for an instruction, there is no duty to
charge as to the credibility of a witness who had been convicted of a
felony. 59 In fact, it has been held that even on request there need be no
such instruction.0 But another court has suggested that instructions are
desirable whether requested or not.6 '
AccoMPLICE
An accomplice is a competent witness.62 In 1824 Circuit Justice
Washington held that an accomplice, separately indicted, is a competent
witness in favor of or against a person indicted for the offense.63 In the
particular case he was allowed to testify for the defendant. In 1841 it
was held that an accomplice may testify against the defendant. "The
law made him a competent witness, though by his own statement he
was an accomplice. '64 However, his testimony should be received with
great caution and where uncorroborated should have little weight. An
accomplice who has already pleaded guilty is competent. 5 In 1947 a
court stated: "A co-conspirator, although an accomplice whose testimony
is uncorroborated, is a competent witness against his co-conspirator,
57Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (two justices dissenting) (1918);
Notes, 16 MIcH. L. REV. 387 (1918); Notes, 27 YALE L. J. 572 (1918); Com-
ment, 27 YALE L. J. 668 (1918). The court below had held likewise in a two
to one decision in Rosen v. United States, 237 Fed. 810 (2d Cir. 1916), and in
a unanimous decision in Pakas v. United States, 240 Fed. 350, 354 (2d Cir.
1917). The case was followed in Ammerman v. United States, 267 Fed. 136,
143 (8th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 650 (1920) ; Peace v. United States
278 Fed. 180 (7th Cir. 1921); Hurwitz v. United States, 299 Fed. 449, 453
8th Cir. 1924); United States v. Segelman, 83 F. Supp. 890, 892 (W.D. Pa.
1949).
58 Sharp v. United States, 195 F. 2d 997, 998 (6th Cir. 1952) (conviction of felony
in state court).
59 Weaver v. United States, 111 F. 2d 603, 606 (8th Cir. 1940).60 Ruvel v. United States, 12 F. 2d 264 (7th Cir. 1926).
61 Weaver v. United States, 111 F. 2d 603, 608 (8th Cir. 1940).
62 On accomplice see 2 WIG oRE, EvIDENcE §§526, 580 (3rd ed. 1940) ; 3 WHAR-
TON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 125-127 (12th ed. 1955); 3 JONES, EVIDENCE 1522-
1527 (5th ed. 1958); UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 243-251 (4th ed. 1935).
63 United States v. Henry, 26 Fed. Cas. 276 (No. 15,351) (C.C.D. Pa. 1824).
64United States v. Lancaster, 26 Fed. Cas. 854, 859 (No. 15,556) (C.C.D. Ill.
1841). The defendant was separately indicted. It appeared that the accomplice
had been arrested, but the facts do not show that he was indicted. See also
United States v. Troax, 28 Fed. Cas. 216 (No. 16,540) (C.C.D. Ohio 1843);
United States v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. 896, 921 (C.C.W.D. Ga. 1891) ; Crawford
v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909).
65 McCormick v. United States, 9 F. 2d 237, 239 (8th Cir. 1925) ; Stoneking v.
United States, 232 F. 2d 385, 392 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 835
(1956).
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not only as to the existence of the conspiracy, but as to the participation
of his co-conspirator therein.
' 66
PERJURERS
Congress passed a statute67 providing that any person convicted of
perjury, or subornation of perjury, under the law of the United States,
shall be incompetent to testify in the federal courts until the judgment
is reversed. 68 But in 1909 this statute was repealed.69 Clearly an alien
convicted of false swearing in a naturalization proceeding under a spe-
cial statute and not under the perjury statute, may testify in a prosecu-
tion for aiding aliens not entitled to naturalization to apply for natural-
ization.7 0
One convicted of perjury is now competent to testify.7 Rule 26
clearly indicates a policy favoring admissibility of such testimony."2 One
not convicted of perjury may testify even though he concedes that he
previously was guilty of perjury.
While a convicted perjurer may testify, the trial judge must instruct
that the testimony of such a witness must be scrutinized with care.7
But a court of appeals later held that where a witness admitted on direct
examination that she had been convicted of perjury before a grand jury,
no clear error was committed in failing to instruct that the testimony
of a perjurer must be viewed with extreme caution."5
THE AccusED
A court has stated: "The requirement that an accused present him-
self for trial is one of the earliest established in the criminal law. The
modern rule is that he must also identify himself, if so required. 76
cc Colt v. United States, 160 F. 2d 650, 651 (5th Cir. 1947).
67REv. STAT. §§5392, 5393 (1878). On perjurers see 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §527
(3rd ed. 1940) ; UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 732 (4th ed. 1935) ; MORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 82 (1954); 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
78-79 (12th ed. 1955).
68 See Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 302 (1892). The witness must have
been convicted. O'Leary v. United States, 158 Fed. 796, 798 (1st Cir. 1907)
Casten v. United States, 298 Fed. 453, 455 (3rd Cir. 1924).
r9 See Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918) ; Casten v. United States,
298 Fed. 453, 455 (3rd Cir. 1924).
70 Latzis v. United States, 97 F. 2d 588, 590 (4th Cir. 1938).
71 United States v. Margolis, 138 F. 2d 1002, 1004 (3rd Cir. 1943) ; United States
v. Segelman, 83 F. Supp. 890, 892 (W.D. Pa. 1949) ; Lucles v. United States,
100 F. 2d 908 (5th Cir. 1939) ; Latigius v. United States, 97 F. 2d 588 (4th Cir.
1938).
*2 Schoppel v. United States, 270 F. 2d 413, 416 (4th Cir. 1959). The court cited
2 WIGiORE, EVIDENCE §519 (3rd ed. 1940).
73 United States v. Thompson, 31 Fed. 331, 333, 335 (C.C.D. Ore. 1887).71 United States v. Katz, 78 F. Supp. 435, 438 (M.D. Pa. 1948). The court cited
2 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §527 (3rd ed. 1940).
75 Mims v. United States, 254 F. 2d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 1958).
715 Kivette v. United States, 230 F. 2d 749, 755 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 935 (1958). See also Swingle v. United States, 151 F. 2d 512 (10th Cir.
1945).
On the accused see 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§579, 581 (3rd ed. 1940) ; Mc-
CORMICK, EVIDENCE 257-259 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
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Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in
part: "The defendant shall be present ... at every stage of the trial."
Admission of testimony on an essential element of the offense in the
absence of the defendant is a direct violation of his right to confront
the witness against him.77
The defendant may in some circumstances be handcuffed at the
trial.78 In the absence of uncontrovertible evidence of hurt, the trial
court is permitted to use such means to safeguard the court, counsel,
jury, and spectators and to assure the continued attendance of the de-
fendant at the trial, as the nature of the case, known criminal record,
character, associates in crime, and reputation of the defendant call for.
Even more clearly the handcuffing of a co-defendant is not prejudicial
error.79 In a prosecution for bank robbery it is not reversible error that
the defendant was brought into court handcuffed, especially when he
was then freed from restraint and the court questioned the jurors and
they stated they would not be influenced. 0 In a recent trial in New
York City in which the defendant hurled a witness chair at the Assistant
United States Attorney, he was put in leg irons and handcuffed.,
In 1867 a district court held that a relator in habeas corpus is a com-
petent witness, as a civil action is involved.8 2 The act of Congress of
186483 provided that "there shall be no exclusion of any witness on ac-
count of color, nor in civil actions because he is a party thereto or in-
terested in the issue to be tried."
A court of appeals has pointed out that "in criminal cases a defend-
ant at common law could not be a witness for himself. He was permitted
in capital cases, and according to some authorities, in cases not capital,
to make an unsworn statement to the jury, but not as a witness, and he
was not subject to cross-examination. ' s4 Circuit Judge Dillon pointed
out in 1876: "The defendant, by the policy of our law, can neither be
compelled nor permitted to testify."s5 The acts of 186286 and 18647 did
82 (1954) ; 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 124-125 (12th ed. 1955) ; 3 JONES,
EVIDENCE 1423-1425 (5th ed. 1958).
77 United States v. Hamrick, 293 F. 2d 468, 469 (4th Cir. 1961).
78 Lias v. United States, 51 F. 2d 215, 217 (4th Cir. 1931) ; McDonald v. United
States, 89 F. 2d 128, 136 (8th Cir. 1937).
79 McDonald v. United States, 89 F. 2d 128, 136 (8th Cir. 1937).
80 Bayless v. United States, 200 F. 2d 113, 114 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 929 (1953). See also Cwach v. United States, 212 F. 2d 520, 527 (8th
Cir. 1954).
81 N.Y. Times, June 5, 1962, p. 34.
82 In re Reynolds, 20 Fed. Cas. 592, 612 (No. 11,721) (N.D.N.Y. 1867).
83 13 Stat. 351 (1864).
84 Wolfson v. United States, 101 Fed. 430, 435 (5th Cir. 1900).
85 United States v. Babcock, 24 Fed. Cas. 913, 926 (No. 14,487) (C.C.E.D. Mo.
1876).
86 12 Stat. 588 (1862).
87 13 Stat. 357 (1864). See Green v. United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 655 (1869).
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not permit the defendant to testify.8 8 The act of 187489 did not remove
the disability.9 0 Repeated attempts to induce Congress to pass a law
providing for competency had failed.
A statute of 1878 permitted a criminal defendant to testify.91 The
Supreme Court referred to this statute in 1892.92 The statute provided
that "in the trial of all indictments, information, complaint, offenses,
and misdemeanors, in the United States courts, territorial courts, and
courts-martial, and courts of inquiry, in any state or territory, including
the District of Columbia, the person so charged shall, at his own request
but not otherwise, be a competent witness. And his failure to make such
request shall not create any presumption against him." While it has been
argued that the statute violates the privilege against self incrimination
because it brings high pressure on the defendant to testify,93 the Su-
preme Court has never so held, nor has any lower federal court.
It has been asserted that if the government calls the defendant to the
stand and thus forces him before the jury to claim his privilege not to
testify, this might be held an implied comment on the failure of the
defendant to testify.94 A court of appeals has held that "it is obvious
that the practice of calling individual defendants to the stand in a
criminal case is a dangerous one which should be employed only with
scrupulous regard for their constitutional rights,"95 but no prejudicial
error was found on the facts. In the first place, individual defendants
as corporation officers may be required to produce and identify corpor-
ate records even though the records may tend to incriminate them. In the
second place, the evidence elicited was stricken so far as it related to
them. It was held that the defendants were not entitled to directed ver-
dicts. Moreover trial was by the court without a jury. The problem is
most likely to arise where several individual defendants are tried and a
corporation is also a defendant.
In a subsequent case it was held that calling the defendant to the
stand even at the request of a co-defendant, violated the privilege against
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment." The error is not cured
88 United States v. Hawthorne, 26 Fed. Cas. 235 (No. 15,332) (C.C.D. Kans.
1871).
89 18 Stat. 180 (1874).
90 United States v. Black, 24 Fed. Cas. 1156, 1157 (No. 14,602) (C.C.D. M\ass.
1875). The bankruptcy statute did not make a criminal defendant a witness.
9" 20 Stat. 30 (1878).
92 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 302 (1892). See also Ferguson v. Georgia,
365 U.S. 570, 577 (1961).
93 See the dissenting opinion of Frank, J. in United States v. Grunewold, 233 F.
2d 556, 571, 578-587 (3rd Cir. 1956).
94 McCORTICK, EVIDENCE §132 at 276 (1954). Compare 8 WIGORE, EVIDENCE
§2268 (2) (a) (,IcNaughton Rev. 1961).
95 Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 140 F. 2d 61, 67 (4th Cir. 1944),
(aff'd without consideration of the point), 323 U.S. 18 (1944). See also United
States v. Fenwick, 177 F. 2d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 1949); Mulloney v. United
States, 79 F. 2d 566, 579 (1st Cir. 1935).
96 United States v. Housing Foundation of America, 176 F. 2d 665 (3rd Cir.
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by striking the testimony and directing the jury to disregard it. The
defendant is unlike an ordinary witness. An ordinary witness could be
placed on the stand though he claimed the privilege against self-incrim-
ination.
On a motion to dismiss an information count, the court should not
call the defendant to the stand and ask him incriminating questions. But
there is no reversible error when the case is later tried to the court and
guilt is established by uncontradcted evidence.7
The defendant may testify as to his own intent where material.' In a
recent case the court stated that "in a criminal proceeding where the
intent of the defendant is in issue the defendant may testify as to what
his intent was."99 The rule against self-serving declarations should not
prevent a defendant from testifying as to his intent.10 A trial judge in
his discretion may deny a defendant who testifies the right to testify as
to his mental and physical condition.' 0'
CO-INDICTEES AND Co-DEFENDANTS
Where several defendants were jointly tried, a defendant could not
call on a co-defendant as a witness in his favor. 0 2 His counsel would
therefore seek to secure, if possible, a separate trial. But in 1834, Cir-
cuit Justice Story held that separate trials need not be granted.10 3 It
made no difference that such testimony could not be used in a joint trial.
A trial court could not, by an act of its own, make a witness competent.
The rights of the Government must be protected. Separate trial had
never been previously granted on such a ground. To grant a separate
trial would be an abuse of sound discretion. Furthermore, a new trial
1949). See McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 257 (1954); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2268(40) (b) (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
97lBuenaventara v. United States, 290 F. 2d 86 (9th Cir. 1961).
98 Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 202 (1909). See 2 WIG tORE, EVIDENCE§581 (3d ed. 1940). 30 App. D.C. 1, 18 (1907). See also Wallace v. United
States, 162 U.S. 466, 477 (1896) ; Cummins v. United States, 232 Fed. 844, 845
(8th Cir. 1916) ; Sparks v. United States, 241 Fed. 777, 791 (6th Cir. 1917) ;
Buchanan v. United States, 233 Fed. 257, 259 (8th Cir. 1916); Hedderley v.
United States, 193 Fed. 561, 568 (9th Cir. 1912).
99 Krogmann v. United States, 225 F. 2d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 1955).100 United States v. M ichener, 157 F. 2d 616, 620 (8th Cir. 1946).
101 Piquett v. United States, 81 F. 2d 75, 81 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
664 (1936).
102 Justice Story has stated: "It is clear by law that confederates in the same
piracy . . . are not competent witnesses for each other.... In a joint trial
the Government has a right to exclude all the prisoners from being wit-
nesses." United States v. Gilbert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1303 (No. 15,204) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1834). See also the view of Grier, J. in United States v. Harding, 26
Fed. Cas. 131, 135 (No. 15,301) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1846). See 2 WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE §580 at 707 (2nd ed. 1921).
On co-defendants see 2 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §580 (3rd ed. 1940) ; 3 WHAR-
TON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 125-128 (12th ed. 1955) ; 3 JONES, EVIDENCE 1522-1523
(5th ed. 1958) ; MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 82-83 (1954) ; UNDER-
HILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 243-251 (4th ed. 1935).
103 United States v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1315 (No. 15,204) (C.C.D. Mass.
1834).
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would not be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence of
persons acquitted at such trial.1°4 In another case, in which two co-
defendants were indicted for assault and battery, counsel for the de-
fendants asked for separate trials, as he wished to examine each as a
witness for the other.10 5 The court stated that it was a matter of discre-
tion to allow separate trials. Neither can be examined as a witness for
the other unless it should appear that there is no evidence against one,
in which case the jury may acquit him, and he may then be examined
for the other. The co-defendant was acquitted and then testified favor-
ably for the defendant who was also acquitted. In another case the court,
on motion of a defendant jointly indicted for larceny on the high seas,
permitted the co-defendant to be separately tried so that he could be
used as a witness for the defendant in the event of an acquittal.10 6 One
case thought it unlikely that the government would join innocent per-
sons so that they might be excluded as witnesses.107 Finally, in 1851,
the Supreme Court held that even where two persons were jointly in-
dicted but separately tried, the defendant first tried could not call the
other as a witness in his behalf. 0 8 But the Court did not hold that the
defendant tried after the first defendant could not call the first defend-
ant if he had been acquitted. Consequently grant of a separate trial,
while of no advantage to the defendant tried first, would be of advantage
to the defendant thereafter tried.
An early case held that an accomplice separately indicted was a
competent witness for the defendant. 0 9 Another early case held that if
several defendants, jointly concerned in an assault and battery, were
separately indicted, but all tried by the same jury at the same time, one
of the defendants could give evidence for the other defendants. 10 The
jury need not first pass on the case against the defendant who was a
witness. The witness could be sworn in all cases but his own, as the de-
fendants were not jointly indicted. The jury was to be regarded as if it
were four separate juries.
o104United States v. Gilbert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1303 (No. 15,204) (C.C.D. Mass.
1834).
105 United States v. Davidson, 25 Fed. Cas. 773. (No. 14,922) (C.C.D.C. 1835).
See also United States v. Harding, 26 Fed. Cas. 131, 135 (No. 15,301) (C.C.
E.D. Pa. 1846).
106 United States v. Davis, 25 Fed. Cas. 784, 785 (No. 14,931) (C.C.S.D. N.Y.
1841).
107 United States v. Harding, 26 Fed. Cas. 131, 135 (No. 15,301) (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1846).
10 8United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851). The court below had
taken a similar view in United States v. Clements, 25 Fed. Cas. 467, 474, 479(No. 14,817) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1851). The case was followed in United States
v. Collyer, 25 Fed. Cas. 554, 561 (No. 14,838) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1855). See 2
WIGMORE, EVIDENcE §580 at 709-710 (3rd ed. 1940).
109 United States v. Henry, 26 Fed. Cas. 276 (No. 15,351) (C.C.D. Pa. 1824). See
also United States v. Hanway, 26 Fed. Cas. 105, 113 (No. 15,299) (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1851).
110 United States v. Hunter, 26 Fed. Cas. 436 (No. 15,425) (C.C.D.C. 1807).
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The Supreme Court has pointed out that at common law where two
persons are jointly indicted and tried together neither is a competent
witness; but if one is tried separately, the other is a competent witness
against him.11' Thus the Government is better off in the second situa-
tion than is the defendant, apparently on the theory that each will try
to swear the other out of the charge when called by the defendant. An
accomplice separately indicted can testify for the Government.12
Following the statute of 1878"1 permitting the defendant to testify,
the Supreme Court suggested in a dictum that a co-defendant could, at
his own request, testify for the other defendant. "Under that statute, if
there had been no severance and the two defendants had been tried
jointly, either would have been a competent witness for the defendants,
and though the testimony of the one bore against the other, it would be
none the less competent.""14 It would seem to follow that in the event of
a severance, co-defendants might testify for the defendant; and if each
defendant was separately indicted, each could testify for the other.
Following the 1878 statute allowing the defendant to testify, it was
held that when two persons are jointly indicted and a severance is or-
dered, one of the defendants whose case is undisposed of may be called
and examined as a witness on behalf of the government against the co-
defendant." 5 If the defendants were separately indicted, another de-
fendant could testify for the Government.'" Even where there is a joint
trial of defendants jointly indicted, a defendant may, at his own request,
be examined as a witness by the Government even though the other
defendant objects."17 But the Government could not call him in the ab-
sence of a request on his part. Where the Government has promised
immunity to co-defendants it should state such fact and might ask for a
severance, and there could be a reversal if harm results.""'
11 Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 334 (1892).
112 United States v. Henry, 26 Fed. Cas. 276 (No. 15,351) (C.C.D. Pa. 1824).
The holding was weak as the witness testified for the defendant.
"13 20 Stat. 30 (1878) ; See 2 WIGORE, EVIDENCE §580 at 710-714 (3rd ed. 1940);
UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 243-246 (4th ed. 1935).
"14 Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 326 (1892). See In Accord, Wolfson
v. United States, 101 Fed. 430, 436 (5th Cir. 1900); United States v. Sims
161 Fed. 1008, 1011 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1907).
".5 Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 333 (1892). Furthermore there could
be waiver of any objection. Bise v. United States, 144 Fed. 374, 376 (8th Cir.
1906). See also Henderson v. United States, 20 Fed. 90, 92 (8th Cir. 1927);
UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENcE 246-251 (4th ed. 1935).
'16 Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 327 (1892).
'7 Wolfson v. United States, 101 Fed. 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1909) ; Heitler v. United
States, 244 Fed. 140, 141 (7th Cir. 1917); United States v. Noble, 294 Fed.
689, 691 (D. Mont. 1923), affirmed, Noble v. United States, 300 Fed. 689 (9th
Cir. 1924) ; Brown v. United States, 253 F. 2d 587 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Channel v.
United States, 285 F. 2d 217, 222 (9th Cir. 1960).
"18 Heitler v. United States, 244 Fed. 140, 142 (7th Cir. 1917) ; Rowan v. United
States, 281 Fed. 137, 139 (1st Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 721 (1922)
(witness testified after pleading guilty).
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In 1952 a court held that a co-defendant may testify against the de-
fendant both under the 1878 statute and under Rule 26.119
Where several defendants are tried together, each has the right to
testify at the trial. 120 He need not obtain the consent of the co-defendant,
and may testify against him. This is the effect of the statute12 1 first
passed in 1878 providing that a defendant shall, at his own request, but
not otherwise, be a competent witness.
Where several defendants are tried for conspiracy and one defendant
in effect becomes a witness against the others, they may cross-examine
him.12
2
Where a defendant takes the stand and testifies, he is not entitled to
an instruction that he could not call his co-defendants to the stand where
they elected not to take the stand, as this could amount to a comment on
the failure of the co-defendants to testify.
1 2
'
It is reversible error to instruct the jury that a witness not called
would be unfavorable to the defendant where such witness had pleaded
guilty and was awaiting sentence as to the conspiracy charge involving
several defendants. 2 4 Such witness was equally available to both the
Government and to the defendant, hence no unfavorable inference can
be drawn not calling such witness.
The jury may be properly informed during the trial that one or more
defendants have pleaded guilty, or the plea may be entered in the jury's
presence, if proper cautionary instructions are given.' 2  But if the de-
fendant in pleading guilty, directly indicates that the other defendants
are guilty also, that is reversible error.1  The same is true if the trial
judge emphasizes the plea of guilty by a co-defendant. 127
The trial judge may deny a motion of the defendant made before
trial for a mental examination of a co-defendant who testified against
the defendant where such motion was based on an affidavit of a psychia-
trist who had never seen the co-defendant.
1 8
119 Sharp v. United States, 195 F. 2d 997, 998 (6th Cir. 1952).
120 United States v. Haynes, 81 F. Supp. 63, 70 (W.D. Pa. 1948); affirmed 173
F. 2d 223 (3rd Cir. 1949) ; Maupin v. United States, 225 F. 2d 680, 682 (10th
Cir. 1955).
12162 Stat. 833 (1948). 18 U.S.C. 3481 (1958).
1- Stanley v. United States, 245 F. 2d 427, 433 (6th Cir. 1957).
123 Bailey v. United States, 282 F. 2d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1960).
-4 Meyer v. United States, 78 F. 2d 624, 630 (9th Cir. 1935) ; Clayton v. United
States, 152 F. 2d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 1945).
125 Casados v. United States, 300 F. 2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1962); Fahning v.
United States, 299 F. 2d 579, 580 (5th Cir. 1962) ; United States v. Crosby,
294 F. 2d 928, 948 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Wood v. United States, 279 F. 2d 359, 363
(8th Cir. 1960); Davenport v. United States, 260 F. 2d 591, 596 (9th Cir.
1958) ; Richards v. United States, 193 F. 2d 554, 556 (10th Cir. 1951) ; Schliefer
v. United States, 288 Fed. 368, 369 (3rd Cir. 1923).
126 Gaynor v. United States, 247 F. 2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
27 Payton v. United States, 222 F. 2d 794, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1955); United States
v. Toner, 173 F. 2d 140,142 (3rd Cir. 1949).
128 Karikas v. United States, 296 F. 2d 434, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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OTHER INTERESTED PERSONS
In some very early cases it was held that the owner of stolen goods
is a competent witness after releasing to the United States his share of
any fine the court may impose on the defendant.129
The victim of fraud is a competent witness.13 The person intended
to be injured by a forgery and the person whose name is forged to a
certificate are competent witnesses to prove the forgery. 31 But if the
witness has paid money upon the forged paper, he is not competent to
prove the forgery, although one judge doubted this. The owner of stolen
goods may be a witness in a larceny prosecution. 1 32
In 1842 the Supreme Court held that the owner of property alleged
to have been stolen on board an American vessel on the high seas is a
competent witness.1 33 It made no difference that conceivably the victim
might recover a part of the penalty or forfeiture, and that the statute
making the act a crime did not expressly provide that the victim might
be a witness. In America, as distinguished from England, the victim of
a forgery is a competent witness. In America the owner of stolen goods
is a competent witness. "The general rule, undoubtedly is, in criminal
cases as well as in civil cases, that a person interested in the event of
the suit or prosecution is not a competent witness. But there are many
exceptions which are as old as the rule itself.""34 The exceptions are
necessary to enforcement of the criminal law. The victim of a robbery
may testify. One who is to receive a reward on conviction may testify.
Informers may testify although they are to receive a part of the penalty
or forfeiture. But while a victim may testify, "[t]he credibility of his
testimony is a matter for the consideration of the jury, under all the
weight of circumstances connected with the case, and his interest in the
result.""'
In an early case it was held on a prosecution for selling liquor, that
the prosecutor whose name is indorsed on the indictment is not a compe-
129 United States v. Clancey, 25 Fed. Cas. 440 (No. 14,800) (C.C.D.C. 1801);
United States v. Hare, 26 Fed. Cas. 139 (No. 15,302) (C.C.D.C. 1802) ; United
States v. Tolson, 28 Fed. Cas. 200 (No. 16,530) (C.C.D.C. 1803) ; United States
v. McCann, 26 Fed. Cas. 1046 (No. 15,655) (C.C.D.C. 1804) ; United States v.
Brown, 24 Fed. Cas. 1246 (No. 14,657) (C.C.D.C. 1804).
On interested persons see 2 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§575-576 (3rd ed. 1940)
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 142-144 (1954); 'ORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
83 (1954) ; 3 JONES, EVIDENCE 1424 (5th ed. 1958).
130 United States v. Porter, 27 Fed. Cas. 595, 596 (No. 16,072) (C.C.D.C. 1812).
131 United States v. Crandall, 25 Fed. Cas. 684 (No. 14,884) (C.C.D.C. 1823).
132 United States v. Tarlton, 28 Fed. Cas. 15 (No. 16,433) (C.C.D.C. 1836). The
court declined to apply Maryland law. A Statute of 1715 of Maryland ex-
cluded such a witness, but only in the county courts and not the provincial.
The jurisdiction of the Federal court did not depend on Aaryland law, but
on an act of Congress.
33 United States v. Murphy, 14 U.S. (16 Pet.) 252 (1842).
134 Id., 14 U.S. (16 Pet.) 254.
'35 Id., 14 U.S. (16 Pet.) 258. The case was referred to favorably in Benson v.
United States, 146 U.S. 325, 335 (1892).
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tent witness for the government."- The witness was interested, as ac-
cording to a Virginia statute of 1792, he was liable to pay the costs.
It is no objection to the competency of a witness that he may be
entitled to a reward on conviction.13 Public safety requires that rewards
should be offered. On grounds of public policy, such an objection goes
only to the credit of a witness.
MARITAL RELATIONSHIP
At common law neither spouse was competent to testify for the
other.'-" Wigmore contended that at common law a spouse was not in-
competent to testify against the other spouse, but that each had a privi-
lege not to testify against the other and not to be the subject of testi-
mony against him by the other." 9 McCormick likewise concludes that the
former should be dealt with as competency and the latter as privilege. 140
Morgan disagrees that the common law was as represented by Wig-
more.' 4 The English Court of Appeal rejected Wigmore's theory.' 4 2
Several modern federal cases seem to follow Wigmore's classification
as to testimony against a spouse. 143 Several decisions of the Supreme
Court spoke in terms of privilege.'4 But others still spoke in terms of
competency. 145 The author of this article, following Wigmore's view,
has dealt with the subject of testimony by a spouse against a spouse in
a separate article entitled "The Husband-Wife Privileges in Federal
Criminal Procedure."
It was as late as the year 1933 before the Supreme Court held that
a spouse may testify in favor of the other spouse. The early cases seemed
to rely on public policy alone.'146 A district court stated: "There can be
no doubt that at common law a wife is not a competent witness for or
against her husband. And this is not on account of interest, but on the
130 United States v. Birch, 247 Fed. Cas. 1147 (No. 14,595) (C.C.D.C. 1809).
"37United States v. Wilson, 28 Fed. Cas. 699, 704 (No. 16,730) (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1830) ; United States v. Murphy, 14 U.S. (16 Pet.) 252 (1842).
138On testimony by the husband or wife of the defendant see 2 WIGMORE,
§§2227-2245 (McNaughton Rev. 1961); MCCORMICK 144-145 (1954); MORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 85-90 (1954) ; 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
100-124 (12th ed. 1955) ; 3 JONES, EVIDENCE 1493-1511 (5th ed. 1958); UNDER-
HILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 668-686 (4th ed. 935) ; Note, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 208
(1961).
139 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §604 (3rd ed. 1940) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2242 (Mc-
Naughton Rev. 1961).
1-
0 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 144 (1954).
141 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 86-87 (1954).
142 Shenton v. Tyler, Ch. D. [1938] 4 All E.R. 501.
'4s United States v. Mitchell, 137 F. 2d 1006, 1008 (2d Cir. 1943) cert. denied,
321 U.S. 794 (1944). Shores v. United States, 174 F. 2d 838, 839, 844 (8th
Cir. 1949) ; Olender v. United States, 210 F. 2d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 1954).144 Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 714 (1949) ; Hawkins v. United States,
358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958) ; Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 528 (1960).145Funk v. United States,-290 U.S. 371, 378 (1933); Brunner v. United States,
168 F. 2d 281 (6th Cir. 1948); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 613
(1952).
146Lucas v. Brooks, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 436, 452 (1873).
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ground of public policy.... There exists no statute of the United States
removing this disability." 14 7 Subsequently it was held by a lower court
that a wife could not testify for her husband because of the "presumed
identity of interest."'148 The Supreme Court followed this view in 1920.49
The theory of interest does not adequately explain the law.150 By now
almost all courts have repudiated the reasons offered for disqualification
by interest. And with respect to public policy, it seems fantastic to say
that where the wife was the only witness who could show the innocence
of her husband, nevertheless she may not testify. 5'
The rule was never changed by legislation enacted by Congress. The
statute' 52 adopting existing state law in determining the competency of
witnesses applied only to federal civil actions, while the state law of 1789
or date of admission to the Union applied in federal criminal cases.153
The Supreme Court so held in 1920 in a case involving testimony by a
wife for her husband.154 The Supreme Court held that the Act of Con-
gress of July 2, 1864,' 5 providing that there shall be no exclusion of a
witness in civil actions because he is a party to or interested in the issues
tried, does not give competency to a wife to testify for her husband.
The Court stated: "That it is a rule of the common law, a wife cannot
be received as a witness for or against her husband, except in a suit
between them, or in criminal cases where he is prosecuted for a wrong
done to her is not controverted."'5 6 The statute of 1878157 permitting a
criminal defendant to testify did not permit a spouse to testify. "In the
absence of a statute expressly allowing the wife to testify for her hus-
band in a criminal action, she is not a competent witness for him.
Neither the removal of the disability of interest nor the allowing of a
defendant to testify in his own behalf in a criminal action makes the
wife a competent witness.' 5 8
In 1893 the Supreme Court stated in a murder prosecution that a
wife "was not a competent witness either in behalf of, or against her
147 United States v. Jones, 32 Fed. 569, 570 (D.S.C. 1887).
'145Knoell v. United States, 239 Fed. 16, 23 (3rd Cir. 1917), error dismissed,
246 U.S. 648 (1917).
149 Jin Fuey Mov v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 195 (1920).L50 2 WIG1 1oE, EVIDENCE §601 (3rd ed. 1940).
"'5' Tinsley v. United States, 43 F. 2d 890, 896 (8th Cir. 1930).
152 REv. STAT. §858; 12 Stat. 588 (1862).
153 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 299 (1891). The 1906 amendment was
similarly interpreted in Maxey v. United States, 207 Fed. 327, 329 (8th Cir.
1913).
54 Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 195 (1920).
'55 12 Stat. at Large 588 (1862) ; REV. STAT. §858; Repealed 1948 Ch. 646.156 Lucas v. Brooks, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 436, 452-453 (1873). See 2 WIGIioRE,
EVIDENCE §§608, 619 (3rd ed. 1940).
157 20 U.S. Stat. at Large 30 (1878).
158 United States v. Crow, 3 Dak. 106, 14 N.W. 437, 438 (1882). See 2 VIaiuom,
EVIDENCE §608, 619 (3rd ed. 1940). See also United States v. Liddy, 2 F. 2d
60 (E.D. Pa. 1924); Talbott v. United States, 208 Fed. 144 (5th Cir. 1913)
as to co-defendants.
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husband.'159 She cannot be placed upon the stand. One justice dissent-
ing concluded that she should be present so that clearer identification of
her husband could be made.Y0 0 This view was followed in several de-
cisions of lower courts.'0 ' In 1911 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
view that a wife could not testify in favor of her husband even in a
murder case.' 62 The Court offered no reasoning and cited a decision
not involving spouses, holding that early state law applies to the admis-
sion of testimony.163 The rule was made even harsher in some cases in
which lower courts excluded a wife's testimony in favor of her husband
even though state law at the time of admission to the Union seemed to
permit her to testify.' Occasionally a court seemingly looked at the
common law rule of exclusion without reference to the law of any par-
ticular state. 6 5 Sometimes the court excluded it by looking at current
decisions of the state in which it sat.1
66
A lower court pointed out in 1919 that the Supreme Court had re-
cently concluded that the "dead hand of the common law rule of 1789
should no longer be applied" to exclude the testimony of convicted
felons. "It may therefore be said with equal reason that the same 'dead
hand' should no longer disqualify husband and wife except as respects
confidential communications.1'' 1 If the trial judge had admitted the
testimony of the wife, the Court of Appeals would not readily have
reversed. But the next year the Supreme Court held that the defendant's
wife is not competent to testify for her husband generally or even to
contradict testimony that certain matters occurred in her presence. 6 8
The Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit held in 1927 that a wife
could testify in favor of her husband in a narcotics prosecution.169 The
159 Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893).
1old. at 122.
161 United States v. Sims, 161 Fed. 1008, 1010 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1907) ; Wesoky v.
United States, 175 Fed. 333, 335 (3rd Cir. 1910).
162 Hendrix v. United States, 219 U.S. 79, 91 (1911).
163 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1891).
164 Adams v. United States, 259 Fed. 214 (8th Cir. 1919); Liberato v. United
States, 13 F. 2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1926), corrected in Rendleman v. United
States, 18 F. 2d 27, 29 (9th Cir. 1927). See Leach, State Law of Evidence in
the Federal Courts, 43 HARv. L. REv. 554, 565-566 (1930).
165 Adams v. United States, 259 Fed. 214 (8th Cir. 1919). The state was Oklahoma.
166 Slick v. United States, 1 F. 2d 897, 899 (7th Cir. 124). The state was Illinois.
167 Fitter v. United States, 258 Fed. 567, 577 (2d Cir. 1919).
168 Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 195 (1920). The case is criticized
in Leach, State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 43 HARv. L. REV. 554,
563-564 (1930). The case was followed in Fisher v. United States, 32 F. 2d
602, 604 (4th Cir. 1929); Barton v. United States, 25 F. 2d 967 (4th Cir.
1928) ; United States v. Swierzbenski, 18 F. 2d 685 (W.S. N.Y. 1927) ; Liberato
v. United States, 13 F. 2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1926) ; Fasulo v. United States,
7 F. 2d 961 (9th Cir. 1925) ; Allen v. United States, 4 F. 2d 688, 695 (7th Cir.
1925) ; Slick v. United States, 1 F. 2d 897, 899 (7th Cir. 1924) ; Krashowitz
v. United States, 282 Fed. 599, 601 (4th Cir. 1922) ; Lowe v. United States
282 Fed. 597, 599 (9th Cir. 1922).
169 Rendlerman v. United States, 18 F. 2d 27 (9th Cir. 1927) discussed by Dood,
Jr., Evidence-Rules Governing Competency of Witnesses In Criminal Trials
In the Federal Courts, 22 ILL. L. REV. 545 (1928) ; Bronough, Comnpetency of
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court pointed out that convicted felons could testify, and that the mod-
ern trend is to remove disability of witnesses. The same court held the
same way in a liquor prosecution, but no reversible error was found in
excluding the wife's testimony. 7 0 The same court upheld a trial judge
in refusing to allow the wife to testify when the defendant failed to make
an offer of proof as to what she would testify. 17 The Eighth Circuit in
1930 sharply criticized the rule preventing the wife from testifying for
her husband as "an absurdity and a relic of legal barbarism which
should no longer be recognized."'' 2 The court referred to an article of
Professor Barton Leach of the Harvard Law School which concluded
that in some states, statutes existed at the date of admission to the Union
qualifying the wife as a witness, and that certainly in such states the
wife should be able to testify for her husband in a federal prosecution. 1 3
The Fourth Circuit adhered to the rule of incompetency in 1931.'7 4
The harshness of the rule was to a slight extent mitigated by various
devices. In some cases the defendant's wife testified for him without
objection by the Government.17 5 On request of the defendant, the jury
should be instructed that the wife cannot testify for her husband where
the facts are such that otherwise the jury might draw unfavorable in-
ferences from her failure to testify. 6
Where several defendants are jointly indicted and jointly tried, an
early case held that the spouse of one defendant could not testify in fa-
vor of another defendant.177 The husband could not be a witness. It
followed that the wife could not be..7 Even after the statute of 1878
permitted a criminal defendant to testify, several cases held that the wife
was not a competent witness for or against a co-defendant at a joint
trial. 7 9 She could not even be a witness in favor of a co-defendant.5 9
Husband or Wife in Criminal Cases in Federal Court, 31 LAw NOTES 108
(1927).
170 Green v. United States, 19 F. 2d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1927), affd, 277 U.S. 438
(1928).
171 Romeo v. United States, 23 F. 2d 551, 552 (9th Cir. 1928), rehearing, 24 F.
2d 527; Hass v. United States, 31 F. 2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1929).
72 Tinsley v. United States, 43 F. 2d 890, 895 (8th Cir. 1930). The court cited
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§600, 601 (3rd ed. 1940).
173 Leach, State Law of Evidence in Federal Courts, 43 HARV. L. REv. 554 (1929).
'74 Dowdy v. United States, 46 F. 2d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1931). Notes, 79 U. PA.
L. REV. 1146 (1931).
1'5 Lusco v. United States, 287 Fed. 69 (2d Cir. 1923) (drug prosecution) ; United
States v. Lindsly, 7 F. 2d 247, 255 (E.D.La. 1925), reversed on other grounds,
12 F. 2d 771 (5th Cir. 1926).
176 Fisher v. United States, 32 F. 2d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1929).
177 United States v. Wade, 28 Fed. Cas. 386 (No. 16,629) (C.C.D.C. 1826). The
court cited only Rex v. Frederick and Tracy, 2 Strange 1095, 93 Eng. Rep.
1054 (1795). See 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §609 (3rd ed. 1940).
17s United States v. Wade, 28 Fed. Cas. 306 (No. 16,629) (C.C.D.C. 1826).
79 Talbott v. United States, 208 Fed. 144 (5th Cir. 1913); United States v.
Liddy, 2 F. 2d 60 (E.D.Pa. 1924).
ISO Dowdy v. United States, 46 F. 2d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1931), Notes, U. PA. L.
REv. 1146 (1931) (where wife's testimony would inure to the benefit of her
husband); Israel v. United States, 3 F. 2d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1925) (where
1962-631
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
However, several cases held that she could be a witness for a co-defend-
ant.""" Several cases left the question open where the wife's testimony
could not affect her husband.18 2
Where several defendants are jointly indicted but separately tried,
several cases left open the question whether the wife of one defendant
could testify for a co-defendant at his separate trial.8 3 Other cases al-
lowed her to testify. 84
Finally in 1933 the Supreme Court held that a wife is competent to
testify in favor of her husband.' 85 State legislation had moved in that
direction.'8 6 The reasons given by the common law were not persuasive.
Its reason as to interest was not convincing because since 1878 even the
defendant could testify, and his interest is even greater. Public policy
favoring the maintenance of harmonious marital relations is fanciful in
the light of modern social conditions. The court in express language left
open the question of the competency of one spouse to testify against the
other.
The Funk case has settled that a wife may testify for her husband
where she is willing to do so. Suppose, however, that she is unwilling.
The problem has seldom arisen. In one case husband and wife had both
been convicted of larceny, and the husband moved for a new trial. When
called by her husband to testify in support of the motion, she stated that
she did not want to testify "against my husband or for him" and as-
signed as her ground, "on the wife's privilege." The wife had not yet
been sentenced, and the period allowed for appeal had not expired. It
wife's testimony would affect the husband's defense); Haddock v. United
States, 294 Fed. 536 (6th Cir. 1923) ; Fitter v. United States, 258 Fed. 567,
576 (2d Cir. 1919) ; United States v. Liddy, 2 F. 2d 60 (E.D.Pa. 1924) ; United
States v. Davidson, 285 Fed. 661, 662( E.D.Pa. 1922).
181 Tinsley v. United States, 43 F. 2d 890, 895 (8th Cir. 1930) ; Romeo v. United
States, 23 F. 2d 551, 552 (9th Cir. 1928) ; Green v. United States, 19 F. 2d
850, 852 (9th Cir. 1927) (not reversible error to exclude however). See
Wigmore, Evidence-Husband Incompetent to Testify for Wife In a Criminal
Case, 15 ILL. L. REv. 453 (1921).
182 Israel v. United States, 3 F. 2d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1925).
83 Dowdy v. United States, 46 F. 2d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1931) ; Notes, 79 U. PA.
L. REv. 1146 (1931). Israel v. United Statese, 3 F. 2d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1925)
United States v. Wade, 28 Fed. Cas. 386 (No. 16,629) (C.C.D.C. 1826).
8140'Brien v. United States, 299 Fed. 568, 569 (8th Cir. 1924), citing WIGMIORE,
EVIDENCE §2234-2237 (McNaughton Rev. 1961); United States v. Addatte,
24 Fed. Cas. 763 (No. 14,422) (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1868).
185 Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933) ; Notes, 14 B.U.L. REv. 175 (1934);
Note, 19 CORNELL L. Q. 480 (1934); Note, 22 GEo. L.J. 626 (1934) ; Note,
19 IOWA L. REv. 488 (1934) ; Note, 23 Ky. L.J. 190 (1934) ; Note, 33 Micu. L.
REv. 306 (1934); Note, 13 ORE. L. REV. 259 (1934); Note, 19 ST. Louis L.
REV. 157 (1934); Note, 8 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 375 (1934); Note, 82 U. PA.
L. REv. 406 (1934).
186At the present time only twelve states have statutes purporting to make
spouses incompetent to testify for one another. But even in such states the
rule is much less rigid than at common law. Note, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 208,
209 (1961).
[Vol. 46
COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES
was held that the wife need not testify, chiefly on the ground of self-
incrimination.'8 7
JtUDGE
In a case decided in 1798, the presiding judge was asked and an-
swered questions on issues of fact by the defendant who called no other
witnesses. 8 Apparently this was regarded as not improper procedure
and the defendant was convicted and sentenced for seditious libel. In a
case decided in 1799 on a prosecution for treason, one of the bench of
judges was sworn and testified to matters connected with the sedition
charged, and he was also cross-examined. °9 In 1916 a judge stated in a
concurring opinion: "Indeed, a judge presiding at a trial is not a com-
petent witness, for the duties of a judge and a witness are incompatible.
If he testified he would have to pass upon the competency of his own
testimony; and as a witness he might be regarded as partisan, and would
be subject to embarassing conflicts with counsel. The danger to the
dignity of the bench, of subjecting its impartiality to doubt and of plac-
ing the defendant at an unfair disadvantage by admitting the presiding
judge as a witness is very obvious."'9 0 Interrogation by a judge should
not be such as in effect to amount to testimony by the judge. Where the
judge, under the form of asking questions of the defendant as to an
interview sought with the judge by the defendant, in effect testified to,
that interview, there was reversible error. 19' At the interview the de-
fendant had intimated his guilt. The Supreme Court stated in 1942 by
justice Murphy: "After the testimony of Abosketes, the court read into>
the record the fact that Abosketes was indicted in Wisconsin in 1936
and 1938, and that he pleaded guilty to one indictment and the other
was dismissed. It is of course, improper for a judge to assume the role
of a witness, but we cannot assume that prejudicial error resulted. Abos-
187 Mills v. United States, 281 F. 2d 736, 739 (4th Cir. 1960). In accord Bisno v.
United States, 299 F. 2d 711, 721 (9th Cir. 1961).
188 Lyon's case, 15 Fed. Cas. 1183, 1184 (No. 8,646) (C.C.D. Vt. 1798). The ques-
tions were asked of Circuit Justice Patterson. The defendant had no counsel,
and apparently the court did not wish to curtail his defense. The case was
heard before two judges.
On competency of Judges see 6 WIGORE, EVIDENCE §1909 (3rd ed. 1940)
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 147 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE,
74-76 (1954) ; 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 74-75 (12th ed. 1955) ; 3 JONES,
EVIDENCE 1512-1514 (5th ed. 1958) ; Annot. 157 A.L.R. 315 (1945) ; Report of
the Special Committee on the Propriety of Judges Appearing as Witnesses,
36 A.B.A.J. 630 (1950) ; UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 686-688; Torkelson,
Testimony of Judge or Juror, 1945 WIS. L. REV. 248, 252; Hart, Testimony
by a Judge or Juror, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 183 (1960).
189 Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 826, 872, 874 (No. 5,126) (C.C.D. Pa. 1799). District
Judge Peters testified. Circuit Justice Iredell was one of the bench of judges.
trying the case.
19 0 Lepper v. United States, 233 Fed. 227, 230 (4th Cir. 1916). This was quoted
in Terrell v. United States, 6 F. 2d 498, 499 (4th Cir. 1925).
'9' Terrell v. United States, 6 F. 2d 498, 499 (4th Cir. 1925).
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ketes had briefly referred to his troubles in Wisconsin in his testi-
mony. 1
92
A federal statute 93 provides: "Any justice or judge of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any, case in which ... he is or has been
a material witness." Rule 41 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence pro-
vides: "Against the objection of a party, the judge presiding at the trial
may not testify in that trial as a witness." Rule 302 of the Model Code
of Evidence provides: "If the judge testifies concerning a disputed
material matter, he shall not continue as a judge in the action against
... objection... ." This appears to be Wigmore's position.194
If the trial judge knows of relevant facts outside the area of judicial
notice, he cannot use them except as a witness or by consent of the
parties. The Supreme Court stated by Chief Justice Hughes: "In the
instant case, the trial judge did not analyze the evidence; he added to it,
and he based his instruction upon his own addition."19 5
A judge is a competent witness in cases in which he is not presid-
ing.1 6 Such a judge may be subpoenaed. 97
JUROR
Where the defendant consents that a juror shall act as interpreter
for a witness speaking a foreign language, no prejudicial error is com-
mitted. 98
The federal cases on jurors as witnesses seem invariably to involve
impeachment of the verdict. No cases have been found of juror testi-
mony at earlier stages of the trial.
In general, a juror is incompetent in civil cases to testify in impeach-
ment of his verdict. 99 Some courts would permit jurors to testify to
192 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 82-83 (1942). In Dillon v. United States,
307 Fed. 2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962), a defendant called the sentencing on a motion
to vacate. The judge did not answer the single question asked.
19328 U.S.C.A. §455 as amended June 25, 1948. The statute goes back originally
to 1911. On the history of the statute and on proposed changes see Report of
the Special Committee on the Propriety of Judges Appearing As Witnesses,
36 A.B.A.J. 630, 631, 702 (1950).
1' 6 WIGMORE, EVIDEN cE §1909 (3rd ed. 1940).
'95 Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 471 (1933). See McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE
690 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 75-76 (1954).
9 Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 826, 851, 874 (No. 5,126) (C.C.D. Pa. 1799). A
state judge testified. In a state criminal prosecution for conspiracy in Illinois
two federal judges testified as witnesses for the criminal defendant. Chicago
Tribune, December 10, 1962, p. 1 col. 5.
97In United States v. Caldwell, 25 Fed. Cas. 238 (No. 14,708) (C.C.D. Pa.
1795) state judges were subpoenaed. See Orfield, Subpoena in Federal Criminal
Procedure, 13 ALA. L. REV. 1, 52 (1960).
198 Thiede v. Utah Territory, 159 U.S. 510, 519 (1895).
On competency of jurors see 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1910 (3rd ed. 1940);
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 147-149 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
76-77 (1954) ; 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 74 (12th ed. 1955) ; 3 JONES,
EVIDENCE 1514-1522 (5th ed. 1958) ; Torkelson, Testimony of a Judge or Juror,
1945 Wis. L. REV. 248; Hart, Testimony by a Judge or Juror, 44 MARQ. L.
REV. 183, 188 (1960).
199 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 266 (1915). See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §68
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misconduct and irregularity which are grounds for new trial.20 0 Ex-
cluded, however, is evidence as to the impressions and arguments of the
jurors in their deliberations and evidence as to their own motives, be-
liefs, and mistakes in arriving at their verdict.201 The testimony of some
jurors, on motion for new trial, that the failure of the defendant to take
the stand was discussed as indicating guilt, and that this was given
weight, is excluded.Y0 2 Attempts from without to influence the jury may
involve an exception to the rule. 203 Jurors may testify in some cases
that newspaper comments on the pending case have been read by the
jury.20 4 Drunkenness, bribery, receiving incompetent documents, or pri-
vately interviewing a party might justify juror testimony.205 But jurors
may not give affidavits or testify that the jury considered documents
giving the criminal history of the defendant made available as part of
the record exhibits.206
In 1953 the Supreme Court stated: "Nor have the courts favored
any public or private post-trial inquisition of jurors as to how they rea-
soned, lest it operate to intimidate, beset, and harass them. This Court
will not accept their own disclosure of forbidden quotient verdicts in
damage cases. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 464. Nor of compromise in
a criminal case whereby some jurors exchanged their convictions on one
issue for concession by other jurors on another issue. Hyde v. United
States, 225 U.S. 437. ' 207
The affidavits of jurors that the defendants were found guilty of
counts in the indictment other than those shown in the verdict as re-
turned in the court were held inadmissible on a motion for new trial.2 0,
at 148. The rule is said to be the same in criminal cases. Lancaster v. United
States, 39 F. 2d 30, 33 (5th Cir. 1930). But see Clark v. United States, 289
U.S. 1, 18 (1933).
200 It seems to be a matter of doubt whether the federal courts have abandoned
the disqualification. Jorgenson v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 160 F. 2d 432,
435 (2d Cir. 1947).
201 Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148 (1892); Hyde v. United States,
225 U.S. 347, 381 (1912) ; Young v. United States, 163 F. 2d 187, 188 (10th
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 770 (1947) ; United States v. Rees, 193 F.
Supp. 861, 863 (D. Md. 1961); Walker v. United States, 298 F. 2d 217,
226 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. Chereton, 309 F. 2d 197, 200 (6th
Cir. 1962).
202 Davis v. United States, 47 F. 2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1931); Williams v. United
States, 3 F. 2d 933, 936 (6th Cir. 1925).
203 Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892) ; Williams v. United States,
3 F. 2d 933, 936 (6th Cir. 1925); Clark v. United States, 61 F. 2d 695, 705(8th Cir. 1932), aff'd. 289 U.S. 1, 18 (1933) ; Jorgenson v. York Ice Machinery
Corp., 160 F. 2d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Note, 47 COL. L. REv. 1373 (1947).
204 United States v. Reid, 14 U.S. 180 (1851) ; Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.
140, 148 (1892).
205 This was said by Hand, J., in Jorgenson v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 160
F. 2d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1947).
206 United States v. Dressler, 112 F. 2d 972, 979 (7th Cir. 1940). One judge
dissented.
207 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1953). See United States v. Bruce,
209 F. Supp. 840, 844 (S.D.Fla. 1962).
208 Young v. United States, 163 F. 2d 187, 189 (10th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
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But they would be admissible to correct the verdict. Affidavits of jurors
that they were influenced by an unauthorized statement of the bailiff
that a verdict must be reached are inadmissible to impeach a verdict of
guilty. 0 9 Jurors may not be called to testify on motion for new trial as
to the effect of improper argument by the Government on the jury 10
In one case the illness of a juror was brought to the attention of the
trial judge during the deliberation of the jury and when the verdict was
returned. The trial judge questioned the juror. It was held on appeal
that the verdict was not unanimous and should not have been received."
The trial court was reversed.
A court has stated: "If any jurors had received communications
from the trial court or the Federal Bureau of Investigation of a nature
which would tend to prejudice them against appellant, or had been sub-
jected to other extraneous inferences, such fact could have been appro-
priately presented by submitting affidavits of the jurors themselves." 212
Members of a jury may be asked whether an experiment was conducted
during their deliberations. 213 Jurors may testify that a newspaper clip-
ping about the defendant was shown by a juror to the other jurors just
before a vote on the verdict was taken.2 1 4 On a motion for new trial
because a juror was upset because of an injury to her husband, the juror
could testify that she was not upset since the injury was slight.21 5
Rule 302 of the Model Code of Evidence provided that "a petit juror
in an action may be a witness therein." Furthermore, "he shall continue
as a juror.., unless the judge finds that to allow him to do so is likely to
prevent a fair consideration by the jury of an issue in action." This
seems to be the prevailing law, and is favored by Wigmore.2 1 6 Rule 42
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence provides that "a member of the jury
sworn and impanelled in the trial of an action may not testify in that
trial as a witness. But if a party or his counsel has been advised or
otherwise has knowledge that a prospective juror may be called as a wit-
ness, the failure of such party to challenge the juror on that ground
shall be deemed a waiver on his part of his right to object to the juror
as a witness."
332 U.S. 770 (1947). See United States v. Chereton, 309 F. 2d 197, 201 (6th
Cir. 1962).
209 United States v. Brown, 99 F. Supp. 527 (D. Alaska 1951), aff'd., 201 F. 2d
767 (9th Cir. 1953).
210 United States v. El Rancho Adolphus Products, 140 F. Supp. 645, 653 (M.D.
Pa. 1956). See also United States v. Nystrom, 116 F. Supp. 771, 777 (W.D.
Pa. 1953).
211 United States v. Pleva, 66 F. 2d 529, 531 (2d Cir. 1933) ; Note, 47 HARV. L.
REV. 717 (1934) ; Note, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 198 (1934).
212 Remsner v. United States, 205 F. 2d 277, 291 (9th Cir. 1953).
213 United States v. Beach, 296 F. 2d 153, 160 (4th Cir. 1961).
214 United States v. Kum Seng Seo, 300 F. 2d 623 (3rd Cir. 1962).
215 United States v. Ross, 203 F. Supp. 100, 102 (E.D.Pa. 1962).
2166 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1910 (3rd ed. 1940).
[Vol. 46
COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES
Wigmore has supported the doctrine that to be distinguished from
rules of incompetency and exclusion is a rule that each juror has a
privilege against the disclosure in court of his communications to the
jurors during their retirement.21 7 On an appeal from a conviction of a
juror for contempt in giving false answers on voir dire examination,
Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Supreme Court stated: "The books
suggest a doctrine that the arguments and votes of jurors, the media
concludendi, are secrets protected from disclosure unless the privilege
is waived.... Freedom of debate might be stifled and independence of
thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their arguments and
ballots were to be freely published to the world. The force of these con-
siderations is not to be gainsaid .... Assuming that there is a privilege
which protects from impertinent disclosure the arguments and ballots
of a juror while considering his verdict, we think the privilege does not
apply where the relation giving birth to it has been fraudulently begun
or fraudulently continued." 218 But the privilege was held inapplicable
because of such fraudulent conduct. It has been asserted that the latter
conclusion was without precedent.219 The lower federal court in the in-
stant case had also held against any privilege on the facts of the present
case.
220
ATTORNEY
The Supreme Court stated in a civil case by Justice Matthews:
"There is nothing in the policy of the law, as there is no positive enact-
ment, which hinders the attorney of a party prosecuting or defending in
a civil action from testifying at the call of his client. ' 221 The Court re-
versed a judgment for the defendant because counsel for the plaintiff
was not allowed to testify. A court held that where an assistant United
States Attorney testified against the defendant in rebuttal as to an essen-
tial matter, such procedure was not to be approved, and held it reversible
error when combined with other error, though not in itself reversible
error.222 There were other government counsel available, and the attor-
ney might have withdrawn when it was discovered that he was a neces-
sary witness.
217 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2346 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
218 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1933).
219 Comment, MARQ. L. REv. 300, 301 (1933). A single New York decision is
cited in Note, 17 MINN. L. REv. 654, 656 (1933). But that decision seems to
be the only one so holding. Note, 11 N.C.L. REv. 347, 348 (1933). See also
the dissenting opinion in Clark v. United States, 61 F. 2d 695, 709, 717 (8th
Cir. 1932).220 United States v. Clark, 1 F. Supp. 747, 752 (D. Minn. 1931) ; Clark v. United
States 61 F. 2d 695, 705 (8th Cir. 1932). The holding is thought to be sound
in principle: Note, 17 MINN. L. R v. 654, 656 (1933) ; 347, 349 (1933). Note,
11 N.C.L. REv. 347 (1933).
221 French v. Hall, 119 U.S. 152, 154 (1886). See as to attorneys MORGAx, BASIC
PRoBLEmS oF EVIDENCE 77-78 (1954); 6 WIG IORE, EVIDENCE §1911 (3rd ed.
1940); 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EViDENCE 72-74 (12th ed. 1955); Annot. 118
A.L.R. 954 (1937) ; Annot. 149 A.L.R. 1305 (1944).
222 Robinson v. United States, 32 F. 2d 505, 510 (8th Cir. 1929).
1962-631
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Where the stenographer of the defendant had testified against him as
to a criminal direction given to her, it was held reversible error not to
let the defendant's office associate, at times engaged by the defendant as
his attorney, contradict her.223 But after he testified the court could
exclude such attorney from further participation in the trial. Judge
Learned Hand has stated: "Lastly, Pietraniello complains that he was
not permitted to call to the stand the attorney for the prosecution with-
out disclosing how his testimony would be relevant. We do not suggest
that an attorney who is trying a case can never be called as a witness,
although the judge appears to have been of the opinion; but merely it
should be a condition that the defense give some reasons for such an,
unusual move. '224 Judge Waterman has stated: "It has been widely
recognized that lawyers representing litigants should not be called as
witnesses in trials involving those litigants if such testimony can be
avoided consonant with the end of obtaining justice. ' 225 The Court
cited Canon 19 of the American Bar Association Canons of Professional
Ethics, providing: "When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except
as to merely formal matters as the attestation or custody of an instru-
ment and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel.
Except where essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid
testifying in court in behalf of his client." The same rule should be
applied to the United States Government and its attorneys. Hence in a
prosecution for perjury, testimony as to what transpired before the
grand jury should not come from the United States Attorney, but from
the grand jury stenographer or from a member of the grand jury. In a
later case the court reversed because of testimony by the Assistant
United States Attorney.
226
In 1960 a court stated: "Although an attorney is competent to testify
in his client's behalf, the court is then justified in excluding him from
further participation in the case."
-2 27
It is not common practice for the Government to call defendant's
counsel as a witness. But it was held not reversible error in the particu-
lar facts of a case.
228
In a federal habeas corpus case involving a state court defendant it
was held that the practice of an attorney, here the prosecuting attorney
testifying in a case and also participating in the trial, is not to be com-
mended, but it is not a denial of due process in a collateral attack on the
223 Christensen v. United States, 90 F. 2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1937).
224 United States v. Chiarella, 184 F. 2d 903, 911 (2d Cir. 1950).
22 United States v. Alu, 246 F. 2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1957).
226 United States v. Pepe, 247 F. 2d 838, 844 (2d Cir. 1957).
- United States v. Clancy, 276 F. 2d 617, 636 (7th Cir. 1960). See also Christen-
sen v. United States, 90 F. 2d 152, 155 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Jackson v. United
States, 297 F. 2d 195, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
229 Irwin v. Dowd, 153 F. Supp. 531, 539 (N.D.Ind. 1957), aff'd., 251 F. 2d 548
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conviction.229 On appeal a concurring judge stated: "Such conduct was
in violation of Canon 19 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Such
conduct was offensive to the right of a defendant to a fair and impartial
trial." 2
30
In a federal habeas corpus proceeding involving federal criminal
defendants it was held that two assistant United States Attorneys who
prosecuted the criminal case were not disqualified in the habeas corpus
proceeding.2 31 The testimony of such attorneys that the petitioners had
waived trial by jury, taken by deposition, was admissible.
THE PROCEDURE OF DISQUALIFICATION
When a witness takes the stand he is assumed to be competent.2 32
Incompetency must be shown by the party objecting to him.
The form of the examination for mental incapacity, is in the discre-
tion of the trial judge, but it is good practice for the judge to interrogate
the witness or to be present at his examination by counsel.2 33 The judge
may talk with a child to determine whether the child is sufficiently ma-
ture to testify.
234
An objection to the competency of testimony after the witness has
left the stand, and after several other witnesses have been subsequently
examined comes too late.2335 It is proper to overrule a motion to strike
out. At common law an objection to the competency of a witness on the
ground of interest had to be made before his examination in chief; or,
if interest was then unknown, as soon as it was discovered.
A party may waive his objections to the competency of a witness.
There is a waiver where there is no objection when the witness was
sworn, nor at any time during the trial.
236
The question of competency of a witness is a preliminary question
to be passed on by the judge. It has been so held in cases involving
229 Irwin v. Dowd, 153 F. Supp. 531, 539 (N.D.Ind. 1957), affd, 251 F. 2d 548
(7th Cir. 1958).230Irwin v. Dowd, 251 F. 2d 548, 554, 555 (7th Cir. 1958), reversed on other
grounds, 359 U.S. 394 (1958).
231 Keller v. Zerbst, 97 F. 2d 257, 258 (5th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 637
(1938).
23 Stephen v. United States, 133 F. 2d 87, 95 (5th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 318
U.S. 781 (1943). An enemy officer was allowed to testify in a treason trial.
On the procedure of disqualification see 2 WIGmoRE, EvMENCE §§483-487, 583-
587 (3rd ed. 1940); McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE 149-150 (1954); 3 WHARTON,
CRiAINAL EVIDENcE 67-70 (12th ed. 1955) ; 3 JONES, EVIDENCE 1527-1529 (5th
ed. 1958).
233 Henderson v. United States, 218 F. 2d 14, 17 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 920 (1955).234 Brown v. United States, 152 F. 2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Jones v. United
States, 231 F. 2d 244 (D.C.Cir. 1956).
235 Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 332 (1892). Here the wife of the
defendant testified for the Government. See also United States v. One Case
of Hair Pencils, 27 Fed. Cas. 244, 245 (No. 15,924) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1825).
This was a forfeiture proceeding involving a deposition.
236 Bise v. United States, 144 Fed. 374, 376 (8th Cir. 1906). A co-defendant
was allowed to testify for the Government.
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competency of a wife to testify against her husband2 3 7 and mental in-
capacity.
23 8
237 Matz v. United States, 158 F. 2d 190 (D.C.Cir. 1946) ; Miles v. United States,
103 U.S. 304, 313 (1880).
23S Young v. United States, 107 F. 2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1939).
